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XPLR Infrastructure L.P.

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This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Contact

Aneesh Prabhu, CFA, FRM
New York
1-212-438-1285
aneesh.prabhu
@spglobal.com

Secondary Contact

Pranav Khattar, CFA
Boston
1-416-507-2549
Pranav.Khattar
@spglobal.com

Ratings Score Snapshot



Credit Highlights

Overview

Key strengths	Key risks
Geographically diverse renewable assets portfolio with a capacity of about 10 gigawatts (GW) of installed renewable generation.	Managing long-term convertible equity portfolio financing (CEPF) conversions and mitigating exposure to near-term CEPF conversions.
Among the top 10 renewable generators in the world, producing 31-33 terawatt hours (TWh) annually.	Meaningful reliance on wind assets, making it vulnerable to wind resource risks.
Highly contracted revenue stream, with an average contract life of 12 years with highly rated counterparties.	Highly leveraged capital structure that has adjustments for debt-like imputations.
	Potential future support for nonrecourse debt-financed investments could result in incremental debt imputation (currently deconsolidated and given equity investment financial treatment).

We view provisions in the U.S. tax and spending bill and the treasury clarifications for renewables capital spending as negative for the renewables sector. While they preserve near-term safe harboring, longer-term growth could slow. We see the cliff in tax credits by year-end

2027 for projects that commence construction after July 2026 as unfavorable. However, the most important aspect of the treasury executive order (EO) report is that any changes to safe-harbored assets would be prospective effective on Sept. 2, 2025. This means projects already safe harbored during 2025 will preserve the ability to complete construction in four years through 2029. We note XPLR Infrastructure L.P. (XIFR) had already done so and thus has line of sight on its projects through 2029. For future safe harbor through July 2026, the treasury will no longer allow the 5% of total project cost spending rule (and retain only the physical work progress test). We think a large developer like XIFR can manage this risk.

We view the potential for projects safe harbored, potentially through 2030, as favorable because it eliminates uncertainty. However, renewables will either need to be cost competitive by 2030 (while providing more reliable generation) or be able to pass through higher costs in higher power purchase agreement (PPA) prices, or they risk deployment slowdowns. In a market substantially short for power, we see the prospects of passthrough of costs as possible.

Wind resource risk contributes to much of XIFR's cash flow available for debt service (CFAD) and EBITDA variability. Following the sale of its natural gas pipelines, XIFR will become a renewables pure play. The biggest drivers in its cash flow variability are wind and solar resources and conditions. XIFR's wind assets have historically performed at production levels of P(50)-P(75), which we incorporated into our base case.

We estimate the company's CFAD from wind projects is now about 61.5% (installed capacity is 79% of total installed megawatts [MW]). While we expect XIFR's wind and solar assets to continue to perform at high availability levels, wind resources have varied and performed particularly weakly in 2019 and 2024. We estimate wind generation variability accounted for about a $30 million CFAD impact in 2024. Given that wind resource has been about par through first half, a 1% decline in resource translates into only a $9 million-$11 million decrease in XIFR's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA for the balance of 2025.

Overcoming a slow start in 2024 and a weak third quarter (93% of expected resource), wind resource was about 98% of P(50) expectation in 2024. This volatility underscores the variable nature of the resource.

We see the announced sale of the Meade pipeline as favorable because it lowers execution risks for XIFR's deleveraging plan. XIFR has signed an agreement to sell the Meade pipeline for about $1.08 billion. We expect the company to use the proceeds to pay the outstanding project level debt and buy out the associated CEPF. The company will also have about $100 million from the asset sale proceeds to redeploy into investments or potentially pay down debt.

The distribution cut in early 2025 is supportive of XIFR's credit but also underscores the debt-like features of CEPFs. As we have noted before, the ability to derisk from CEPF-related settlements remains the salient credit driver.

XIFR's historic aggressive growth and attendant financial policy have detracted from its credit quality. We viewed the initial two CEPF issuances as consistent with balanced growth given the company's relatively smaller asset footprint and equity float as of 2018. The CEPF vehicle helped time the issuance of equity with the growth in its cash flow such that the company's distributions rate grew at a measured fashion. However, the continued pursuit of an aggressive 12% distribution growth became a credit weakness because it made the company pursue the CEPF vehicle aggressively, exposing XIFR to extraneous market environment risks.

With a significant increase in interest rates since February 2022 that has also influenced its unit share price, XIFR has revised its strategy to a capital allocation-based vehicle from a growth vehicle. With no distributions, issuing equity is credit accretive to XIFR regardless of the prevailing unit price. While we recognize XIFR has the option of issuing equity, we impute debt on the balance sheet because these settlements can also come from cash.

However, we give net debt credit for cash accumulated through the preservation of retained CAFD. Analytically, this results in the addback of future CEPF settlements as debt imputations, offset by the accumulation of cash retained to address the settlements as they come due.

We imputed about $2.9 billion of debt obligations over and above the existing $4.0 billion of balance sheet debt. In our adjustments, we assumed, based on residual equity in the portfolio assets, that XIFR will make economic decisions, such as choosing to flip CEPFs to the joint-venture partner in the portfolios where it has little to no equity remaining instead of settling the outstanding CEPF balances.

With these adjustments, XIFR's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA increases to about 7.5x in 2025--and is firmly in the highly leveraged financial category--but as a result of cessation of distributions preserve cash flows, its discretionary cash flow to S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt will be 8%-10%, offsetting the higher leverage to an extent.

If XIFR eventually settles 50% of these obligations (for example) with cash and equity each, its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA would be 6.0x in the outer years of our forecasts.

Outlook

Given high leverage because of debt imputations relating to CEPFs, we will monitor capital allocation between repowering capital expenditure (capex) needs and preserving cash to fund upcoming CEPF settlements. The negative outlook reflects not only XIFR's higher leverage in the near term but execution risks of upcoming CEPF settlement payments and refinancing needs in 2026 and 2027 corresponding to the 2020 CEPF. While XIFR’s projects are well conceived, we believe its ability to support growth in a credit supportive manner will be a key driver of its ratings. We expect the negative outlook will remain at least until 2026 as XIFR executes further on its strategic plan.

While we expect XIFR's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA to rise to about 7.25x in 2025, it is offset by discretionary cash flow to S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt of 8%-9% from the retention of distributable CAFD for reducing debt liabilities.

Downside scenario

We will lower the ratings if we believe XIFR's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted leverage will remain above 7.0x on a sustained basis or its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted discretionary cash flow to debt falls below 6.5%. A downgrade may result from significantly lower cash flows from the company's projects because of poor operating performance and resource risk or higher borrowing costs. This could also occur if we believe the company will support its nonrecourse financings that could result in incremental debt amounts in our ratio calculations.

Upside scenario

We expect to maintain the negative outlook until 2026. We could revise the outlook to stable if XIFR improves its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA below 6.5x and continues to retain cash flow consistent with its capital allocation strategy that we assess as adequate to address the outer-year CEPFs. We expect this will either require discretionary cash flow and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to be maintained at about 8%-10%, or it becomes evident that the unit price is recovering, and the company remains committed to issuing equity units against its CEPF obligations.

Our Base-Case Scenario

Assumptions

- EBITDA margin of 60%-62% for 2025 and beyond. Margins improve partly after the pipelines are sold and partly due to the reset of production tax credits from repowerings.
- Because we have imputed debt for CEPF settlements, we also add back gross EBITDA as if it is fully consolidated.
- We include only residual distributions from Mountain View, Shafter, XIFR Renewables, Coram CA Development L.P., and Emerald Breeze in our cash flow assumptions. Correspondingly, we do not consolidate related debt.
- We include net pay-as-you-go receipts (and some other tax credits inflows) as part of investing cash flows as per S&P Global Ratings' accounting practice (i.e., these are excluded from EBITDA). This analytical treatment is different from how XIFR reflects tax credits in its financials. For 2024, the amount excluded from EBITDA is about $1 billion.
- Because it is being held for sale, we include proceeds from sale of the Meade Pipeline of $1.08 billion, offset against $820 million of project debt and $220 million of CEPF settlements.
- XIFR-level capex of $20 million-$50 million over the forecast period. This excludes the repowering capex funded by nonrecourse financing.
- We project no distributions in the future years. The company continues to make minority ownership distributions.
- By scaling back on distributions, XIFR will generate $550 million-$650 million of retained cash flow every year. Because cash is fungible and could be used temporarily for capex, we give a 75% surplus cash credit against outstanding debt.
- We consolidate 100% of CEPF debt to our aggregate debt.
- After evaluating the residual equity in the CEPF portfolios, we assume XIFR will sell, or flip, the 2021 Apollo CEPF to its joint-venture partner. Consequently, we removed this portfolio cash flow from the financials but have also not imputed debt for this CEPFs in our analysis.

Key metrics

XPLR Infrastructure L.P.--Forecast summary

Period ending	Dec-31-2025	Dec-31-2026	Dec-31-2027	Dec-31-2028
	2025e	2026f	2027f	2028f
Adjusted ratios				
Debt/EBITDA (x)	7.4	6.9	6.2	6.4
FFO/debt (%)	9.6	10.0	10.2	10.0
FFO cash interest coverage (x)	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.4
DCF/debt (%)	8.1	8.3	7.3	8.1

All figures are adjusted by S&P Global Ratings, unless stated as reported. e--Estimate. f--Forecast. FFO--Funds from operations. DCF--Discretionary cash flow.

Company Description

XIFR, originally a growth-oriented limited partnership, was formed by NextEra Energy Resources (NEER), a division of parent NextEra Energy Inc. (NEE), to acquire, manage, and own contracted energy projects with relatively stable, long-term cash flows. As of June 31, 2025, XIFR owned an approximately 48.6% limited partner interest in XIFR OpCo. XIFR OpCo. and NEE owned a noncontrolling 51.4% limited partner interest. Through XIFR OpCo., XIFR has ownership interests in a portfolio of contracted renewable generation assets consisting of wind, solar, and battery storage projects. XIFR is selling its ownership interest in the Meade pipeline (a 0.7 billion cubic feet [bcf] share).

Since the company's IPO in 2014 and the initial rating in mid-2017, XIFR has expanded its asset base substantially. Its growth has diversified the portfolio both geographically and technologically, increased cash flow generation, and reduced offtaker concentration risk. XIFR owns about 10 GW of renewable-energy generation, mostly under long-term PPAs. As of June 31, 2025, the company owned 8,049 MW in wind, 1,790 MW in solar, and 274 MW in storage. We note the Meade pipeline owns a 39.2% interest in the 1.7 bcf Central Penn Line (XIFR's share equates to 0.7 bcf), which is accounted for as an equity method investment in XIFR's financials.

Peer Comparison

While XIFR is more comparable with peers like Clearway Energy and Brookfield Renewables, we asses those companies as project developers. Our assessment of XIFR as a corporate issuer is based on its use of CEPF funding, which make assets under this form of financing moderately strategic to XIFR.

We include Vistra Corp., Capital Power, and Transalta Corp. in our peer comparison. While these companies have similar operations that include generation businesses throughout the U.S., they have significant merchant exposure with ratable hedging. These companies are relatively larger asset portfolios that are reasonably diversified across fuel types and regions, but XIFR benefits from its much higher 13-year contracted profile.

XIFR also has the largest renewable-only asset profile. From a contract profile perspective, XIFR is comparable to TransAlta, whose cash flows are also underpinned by long-term PPAs, which is reflected in its strong business risk profile. Peer Capital Power has about 60% of margins contracted under long-term agreements. TransAlta’s growth strategy is also somewhat similar to XIFR and has recently focused more on renewable deployment. On the other hand, Capital Corp also purchases mid-life natural gas assets. Finally, unlike peer Vistra, XIFR has no retail presence nor a significant exposure to the relatively volatile Electric Reliability Council of Texas market.

Financially, XIFR is smaller in size compared with Vistra (EBITDA of approximately $5.0 billion) but is similar to TransAlta and Capital Corp. Also, XIFR’s renewable advantage is reflected in its EBITDA margins. At 61% in 2024, its EBITDA margin is much higher compared with its peers.

Business Risk

We view XIFR's business risk as stronger than peers. Our business risk profile assessment of XIFR is strong, reflecting its extremely contracted revenue stream with highly rated counterparties and a scale that has grown both geographically and technologically.

XIFR's geographic presence has grown to 31 states in 2024 from one state as of its IPO in 2014. Its renewables portfolio is diverse, with a mix of solar, wind, and battery storage assets, and has grown to about 9.8 GW of renewable energy generation from less than 1 GW of installed generation in 2014, 274 MW of paired storage, and 0.7 bcf of pipeline capacity (39.2% interest in a 1.7 bcf pipeline).

The company is now among the top 10 renewable generators in the world, producing about 33 TWh annually. XIFR has a weighted-average remaining contract life of 12 years, with about 80 different offtakers, and its renewables portfolio has none to limited exposure to commodity price fluctuations. Existing assets have about 23 years of remaining useful life.

The company's revenue streams are contracted with mostly investment-grade offtakers. Of note, its highly contracted renewables focus remains a strong competitive advantage relative to merchant-exposed peers with primarily thermal generation. XIFR also continues to expand its presence in the battery storage segment, which further diversifies the portfolio.

XIFR has access to a wide pipeline of assets; however, we expect its growth to be tempered. XIFR benefits from NEER operating its renewable portfolio, providing XIFR with access to NEER's scale and top-decile operating cost performance. The company continues to have a strong track record of wind and solar operation and maintenance (O&M) cost performance, with costs that remain in the top decile even after incorporating recent increases in wind O&M costs pertaining to older assets.

For the existing fleet, there are opportunities through wind repowerings. XIFR indicated it has identified about 1.6 GW of wind facilities. Specifically, there are near-term organic growth opportunities with about 1.3 GW of repowering of its wind portfolio. The company successfully completed the repowering at Palo Duro (263 MW) and Mammoth Plains (209 MW). About 740 MW of the 1.6 GW has been completed through first half 2025. These are the only major growth capital opportunities that we expect the company to undertake through 2026, mainly via nonrecourse financings. No further growth is reflected in our forecasts.

Financial Risk

We expect S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of 7.0x-7.5x and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted funds from operations to debt of about 10% in 2025. The high leverage is a result of CEPF obligations being imputed as debt obligations. XIFR has ceased distributions to preserve cash flows. Once it successfully executes buyouts of CEPFs through excess cash and sale of assets to fund their buyouts, we expect S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA to be 6.0x-6.5x in 2026 and 2027. Given the 12-year contracted weighted-average profile, we view ratios consistent with our medial volatility measures. We expect no meaningful new debt issuances as the company addresses its CEPF obligations.

Our analysis excludes several nonrecourse debt financings, an analytical treatment that we continually assess. We view nonrecourse financing as an avenue for companies in the renewable segment to finance some of their investments. However, the mere fact that a financing is nonrecourse does not imply it is automatically deconsolidated. We evaluate nonrecourse financings on their individual merits, factoring in aspects like residual equity value, the importance of the assets to the business strategy, or influential investors who can extract terms to their benefit. We assess this treatment on an ongoing basis for each nonrecourse financing, including our analytical treatment for new nonrecourse financings.

Importantly, we note there is only a limited capacity for nonrecourse financings. The higher the use of nonrecourse financing, the greater is the structural subordination of the holding company's unsecured debt. We underscore that due to nonrecourse financings (in a distressed scenario, residual value often gets trapped at projects) and CEPF obligations that take priority value distribution from portfolio assets, the recovery score on XIFR OpCo.'s unsecured debt in our distressed analysis is 40%-45%. Were this to decline to 30%, we would notch down the unsecured debt at XIFR OpCo. by one notch to reflect structural subordination.

In our assessment of XIFR, we deconsolidate several nonrecourse financings and include only distributions from these projects in its financial numbers. For instance, we deconsolidate the Meade pipeline's debt because we view it as nonstrategic to XIFR (it announced the sale of this asset in 2025). As a result, we consider it both nonrecourse and nonstrategic. Among the other nonrecourse financings, we do not view Coram, Indigo Plains, and Whiptail-Montezuma as large enough portfolios to be strategic.

While XIFR Renewables II (formerly NEP Renewables II) is a relatively large portfolio, we have given it nonrecourse treatment because we do not see meaningful residual value after distributing value to the project-level debt. The company has raised about $426 million of nonrecourse financing 2025 and has secured commitments for an incremental $600 million. We note about $2.0 billion of nonrecourse debt will remain outstanding even after the Meade pipeline debt is paid off, relative to the roughly $4 billion of on-balance sheet debt.

Debt maturities

XIFR has meaningful debt maturities over the next two years, which include the following.

2025:

- Senior unsecured convertible notes of $600 million, of which $418 million remained outstanding as of June 2025 (repaid from proceeds of the $1.75 billion Holdco financing raised in March 2025).

2026:

- 2.5% senior unsecured notes of $500 million.
- 3.88% senior unsecured notes of $500 million.

NEP has been renamed XPLR Infrastructure. Removing the NextEra name distances the company from NEE. Our ratings on XIFR do not assume support other than the level extended (suspension of management fee and identifying key personal). However, we will continue to monitor whether this changes XIFR's ability to utilize its erstwhile banking relationships or affects its access to credit markets in any manner.

Liquidity

We currently assess XIFR’s liquidity as adequate. As of June 2025, the company has about $4.4 billion of corporate Holdco debt, of which $918 million is low-cost converts that mature by June 2026.

XIFR raised $1.75 billion in debt in March 2025. This issuance was supposed to fund a $600 million convertible maturity in 2025 and prefund one of the two $500 million maturities in 2026. However, as cash is fungible, the company used the cash to pre-fund the 2025 June CEPF settlement ($931 million settled in April 2025), partly finance the 2025 unsecured maturity, and for interim revolver draws.

We expect organic growth plans, including CFAD-enhancing repowering’s ($1.3 billion) in 2025 and 2026, which we expect it to fund with about $800million of net nonrecourse project debt ($1.6 billion to $1.7 billion of debt raised offset by about $900 million of repayments) raised through

2025 and in 2026. We expect it to fund repowerings in 2025 and 2026 with nonrecourse project debt raised throughout 2025.

Note: These sources and uses exclude project financed repowerings and corresponding nonrecourse debt raised.

Principal liquidity sources

- Cash on hand of about $880 million as of June 30, 2025.
- About $900 million of funds from operations over the next 12 months.
- Nnearly full availability under its revolver of about $2.45 billion as of June 30, 2025.
- Net proceeds from sale of Meade that we estimate at about $100 million.
- $1 billion of high-yield debt.

Principal liquidity uses

- Maintenance expenditure of $20 million-$30 million over the next 12 months.
- About $1.17 billion for CEPF settlements (Meade buyout of $225 million and $945 million for the 2019 KKR buyout).
- $1 billion of maturing senior unsecured convertible notes.

Covenant Analysis

Requirements

The holding company needs to maintain a leverage coverage ratio of less than 5.75x to 1.0x and an interest coverage ratio of at least 1.75x to 1.00x to make a distribution. As of June 30, 2025, XIFR and its subsidiaries were in compliance with all financial covenants (5.0x of leverage and 3.9x of coverage at the operating company), and we expect the company to remain in compliance during our forecast period.

Environmental, Social, And Governance

ESG factors have an overall neutral influence on our credit rating analysis of XIFR. Its total renewable generation accounts for about 80% of EBITDA, which includes wind and solar power plants. The company will become a renewables pure play by 2025 once all pipeline assets are dispensed. This gives it a competitive edge environmentally because these plants offer reduced emissions.

Group Influence

Because of substantial governance changes--including audit committees, conflicts committees, guidelines for related-party transactions, and changes that give XIFR's unitholders the ability to elect the majority of its board--we view XIFR as nonstrategic to NEER. However, we will continue to monitor the relationship because the two companies have strong reasons to interact on business interrelationships. Specifically, XIFR does not have any employees of its own.

We view the waiver of incentive distribution rights fees as an indication of parental support. From a credit perspective, any support extended to XIFR by NEER would buttress the ratings on XIFR.

Issue Ratings--Recovery Analysis

Key analytical factors

- Our default scenario assumes a drop in distributions from major projects following a combination of deteriorating economic conditions and weaker resource availability for XIFR's wind-generation assets. The decreasing demand, coupled with low natural gas prices, result in lower capacity factors and higher maintenance spending for the portfolio. We assume this, in turn, depresses XIFR's equity price because the prospects of settling the CEPFs with equity decrease. An increase in its operational challenges and higher debt means that XIFR is unable to refinance its 2027 maturities.
- For our valuation, we revised the methodology to discrete asset valuation (dollar per kilowatt; $/KW) instead of using the EBITDA multiplier methodology. We did so because renewable assets tend to sell at higher multiples of their cash flow given the tailwinds provided by renewable portfolio standard mandates.

Simulated default assumptions

- We believe if XIFR were to default, it would still have a viable business model. This is because there is continued demand for its portfolio of contracted renewable energy assets. Therefore, we believe lenders would achieve the greatest recovery amounts through reorganization of the company rather than liquidation. However, some assets may have to be sold and CEPF's portfolios flipped to joint-venture partners to reduce outstanding obligations during reorganization.
- We valued the company on a going-concern basis using the discrete asset value methodology. We valued wind, solar, and storage assets ranging from $700/KW to $1,100/KW based on the financing type of the asset, i.e., if the asset is unlevered, encumbered by project debt, and/or tax equity.
- $/KW values also differed based on PPA tenor, operating vintage of the asset, and geographical region.
- We assume asset values in a joint-venture CEPF structure are first used to settle any outstanding CEPFs before residual value is available at the XIFR/XIFR OpCo. level. Similarly, asset values first extinguished project debt wherever applicable.
- Because we assume deteriorating financial and operational performance from 2025, we view the company as only partially funding its organic growth repowerings.
- We assume 100% of the CEPF outstanding amounts are settled with surplus cash.
- Based on our assessment of the equity value, we assume XIFR will sell the Meade pipeline in 2025 to settle the CEPF from excess sale proceeds (after netting project debt).
- We made a similar assumption for the 2021 Apollo portfolio. Specifically, we assume either the assets are sold and the proceeds used to settle outstanding CEPF amounts or the portfolio cash flows are flipped to the joint-venture partner.
- We assume the $2.5 billion revolver is 85% drawn at the point of default. Effectively, we assume XIFR uses its revolver for operational expenses and to settle some of its obligations (tax buyouts or CEPFs balances to unencumber assets). Assuming this level of draw is standard per our criteria.

- XIFR owns the general partner of XIFR OpCo. and about 48.6% of XIFR OpCo.'s common equity. XIFR OpCo., in turn, owns all of the membership interests in XPLR Infrastructure U.S. Partners Holdings LLC (XIFR U.S. Holdings). XIFR U.S. Holdings is the holding company for all of XIFR OpCo.'s U.S. assets. The securities and debt instruments are issued under one of these three entities. The priority of the debt is affected by this ownership structure.
- The senior notes will have priority over the convertible senior notes in the event there is a default by XIFR OpCo. and XIFR, causing both classes of debt to come due at the same time and triggering XIFR OpCo.'s and XIFR U.S. Holdings' guaranty obligations. XIFR U.S. Holdings' guaranty of the senior notes grants structural priority to the holders of those notes over the holders of convertible senior notes, which do not have the benefit of a XIFR U.S. Holdings guaranty.
- However, in order for priority to matter, both XIFR OpCo. and XIFR have to be in default at the same time. Although it is theoretically possible, under the current capital structure there is no practical situation in which XIFR could default and not XIFR OpCo.
- XIFR issued $500 million of four-year convertible notes in 2022. As with the convertible notes, XIFR's payment obligations are paid through the proceeds of XIFR OpCo.'s intercompany obligations. For all practical purposes, a failure to pay under the notes would be the result of a failure to pay at XIFR OpCo.

Simplified waterfall

- Gross enterprise value: About $7.0 billion, based on the total asset values
- After reducing the emergence enterprise value by 5% for administrative expenses: $6.6 billion. The CEPF buyouts are offset by the value of assets and there is some residual equity value flowing to XIFR
- Total collateral value available to secured debt: $3.9 billion
- Total first-lien debt: $2.2 billion
- --Recovery expectation: 90%-100% (recovery rating: '1')
- Total value available to unsecured debt: about $1.7 billion
- Total senior unsecured debt: $4.17 billion
- --Recovery expectation for unsecured debt: 30%-50% (rounded estimate: 40%)

Rating Component Scores	
Foreign currency issuer credit rating	**BB/Negative/--**
Local currency issuer credit rating	**BB/Negative/--**
Business risk	**Strong**
Country risk	Very Low
Industry risk	Moderately High
Competitive position	Excellent
Financial risk	**Highly Leveraged**
Cash flow/leverage	Highly Leveraged
Anchor	**bb**
Modifiers	
Diversification/portfolio effect	Neutral (no impact)
Capital structure	Neutral (no impact)
Financial policy	Neutral (no impact)
Liquidity	Adequate (no impact)
Management and governance	Neutral (no impact)
Comparable rating analysis	Neutral (no impact)
Stand-alone credit profile	**bb**

Related Criteria

- Criteria | Corporates | General: Methodology: Management And Governance Credit Factors For Corporate Entities, Jan. 7, 2024
- Criteria | Corporates | General: Corporate Methodology, Jan. 7, 2024
- General Criteria: Environmental, Social, And Governance Principles In Credit Ratings, Oct. 10, 2021
- General Criteria: Group Rating Methodology, July 1, 2019
- Criteria | Corporates | General: Corporate Methodology: Ratios And Adjustments, April 1, 2019
- Criteria | Corporates | General: Recovery Rating Criteria For Speculative-Grade Corporate Issuers, Dec. 7, 2016
- Criteria | Corporates | General: Methodology And Assumptions: Liquidity Descriptors For Global Corporate Issuers, Dec. 16, 2014
- General Criteria: Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 19, 2013
- General Criteria: Methodology: Industry Risk, Nov. 19, 2013
- General Criteria: Principles Of Credit Ratings, Feb. 16, 2011

Ratings Detail (as of September 18, 2025)*	
XPLR Infrastructure, LP	
Issuer Credit Rating	BB/Negative/--
Issuer Credit Ratings History	
28-Jan-2025	BB/Negative/--
23-Jun-2017	BB/Stable/--

Ratings Detail (as of September 18, 2025)*

*Unless otherwise noted, all ratings in this report are global scale ratings. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings on the global scale are comparable across countries. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings on a national scale are relative to obligors or obligations within that specific country. Issue and debt ratings could include debt guaranteed by another entity, and rated debt that an entity guarantees.